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CaseNo.20070216-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Kenneth Ray Underwood, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for burglary, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), and theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES1 
1. Did the admission of hearsay testimony violate Defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him? 
Standard of Review. The Court's "standard of review on the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence is complex, since the determination of admissibility 'often contains 
1
 To facilitate its argument, the State addresses Defendant's second issue in 
point IQ, his third issue in point IV, and his fourth issue in point II. 
a number of rulings, each of which may require a different standard of review/" 
State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66,f10,122 P.3d 639 (quoting Norman H. Jackson, Utah 
Standards of Appellate Review, 12 Utah Bar J. 8,38 (1999)). The Court "review[s] the 
questions of fact for clear error" and "the district court's ruling on admissibility for 
abuse of discretion." Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court "review[s] the legal 
questions to make the determination of admissibility for correctness." Id. Whether 
a defendant was denied the constitutional right to confront the witnesses against 
him "presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness." State v. 
Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, f 47,125 P.3d 878. However, where a claim is raised for the 
first time on appeal, as here, this Court will not review that claim absent a showing 
of plain error. See State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, f f 38-39,20 P.3d 271. 
2. Did the prosecutor lay a proper foundation for the admission into evidence 
of the coins and medallions obtained from the office of Aric Cramer? 
Standard of Review. "A trial court's determination that there was a proper 
foundation for the admission of evidence 'will not be overturned unless there is a 
showing of an abuse of discretion/" State v. Torres, 2003 UT App 114,f7,69 P.3d 
314 (quoting State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667,671 (Utah App. 1988)). 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for burglary 
and theft? 
2 
Standard of Review. When reviewing the results of a bench trial for sufficiency 
of evidence, the Court reviews the trial court's findings for clear error. State v. 
Briggs, 2008 UT 52, \ 10. Accordingly, the Court will "'sustain the trial court's 
judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [the Court] 
otherwises reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" 
Id. (quoting State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, f 5,84 P.3d 1167). And where, as here, the 
defendant did not preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by proper 
motion or objection, he must demonstrate that the insufficiency was obvious. State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17,10 P.3d 346. But see State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106,19 
n.4, 999 P.2d 1252 (holding that under rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the first 
time on appeal when the verdict arises from a bench trial). 
4. Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for failing to move for a 
directed verdict after the parties had rested? 
Standard of Review. "Ineffective assistance of counsel arguments raised for the 
first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness as a matter of law." State v. Vos, 
2007 UT App 215,f9,164 P.3d 1258, cert, denied, 186 P.3d 347. 
5. Where the State inadvertently failed to move for the admission of certain 
exhibits during its case in chief, did the trial court properly permit the State to 
reopen its case after Defendant rested to permit admission of those exhibits? 
3 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to reopen a case to permit a party 
to introduce additional evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Gregorious, 81 Utah 33,16 P.2d 893,895 (1932). 
6. Did the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprive Defendant of a fair 
trial? 
Standard of Review. This Court will not reverse a conviction under the 
cumulative error doctrine unless "the cumulative effect of the several errors 
undermines [the Court's] confidence... that a fair trial was had." State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201,1229 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 901(a), Utah Rules of Evidence 
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support 
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary and theft, both second degree felonies. 
R. 1-2. Initially, he was represented by the public defender, but he thereafter 
retained Stephanie Miya, a St. George attorney, to represent him. R. 4, 22. 
Following a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over to stand trial on both 
charges. R. 25-26,30-32. Citing, among other things, the possibility that Ms. Miya 
may be called as a witness by the State to testify about her receipt of coins allegedly 
taken in the burglary, the State filed a motion to disqualify Ms. Miya as Defendant's 
attorney. R. 308:45-51. She opposed the motion, but moved to withdraw because 
Defendant had not paid for her services and had expressed his wish to represent 
himself. R. 58-66, 67-70. The trial court declined to rule on the State's motion to 
disqualify, but granted Ms. Miya's motion to withdraw. R. 55-56. Defendant 
subsequently waived his right to an attorney, electing to proceed pro se, and the 
court appointed a public defender to act as standby counsel. R. 103,105. 
After Ms. Miya was subpoenaed by the State to testify at trial, her attorney, 
Aric Cramer, filed a motion to quash the subpoena. R. 106-09. That motion was 
denied at trial. R. 126; R. 308: 54-65. Following a two day bench trial, Defendant 
was found guilty of both counts as charged. R. 126-27,132-33, 308-09. He was 
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen years on both counts. R. 139-
40. Nearly ten months after sentencing, Defendant moved to set aside or vacate his 
5 
sentence on the ground that he had imcovered mitigating evidence in the form of 
mental health records. R. 161-70. The trial court denied the motion for lack of 
jurisdiction. R. 187-88. A motion to reconsider that decision was also denied. R. 
203-08,222-26. 
On October 11,2006—almost one year after being sentenced—Defendant filed 
a pro se notice of appeal. R. 181-82. After being appointed to represent defendant 
on appeal, the public defender filed a second notice of appeal. R. 198-99,212. This 
Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. R. 241-43. Defendant filed with 
the trial court a motion to reinstate the appeal. R. 237-40, 249-52. The trial court 
granted Defendant's motion and reinstated the appeal. R. 255-56. Defendant, 
through appointed counsel, thereafter filed a third notice of appeal. R. 259-60. 
Defendant also filed a fourth notice of appeal prose. R.270. Defendant, through his 
attorney, filed a motion with this Court asking that the case be remanded under rule 
23B, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to determine whether he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel. R. 272-73. The Court denied Defendant's motion, but 
remanded the case to the district court "to determine whether conflict appellate 
counsel [should] be appointed." R. 282-83. On remand, the district court found no 
conflict and remanded the case back to this Court. R. 301,305-06. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January 1999, Defendant married Susan Weight. R. 308:19. The couple 
gave birth to a son in 2003. R. 308:22. But in February 2004, Susan left Defendant 
and filed for divorce. See R. 308:21-2. She and her son moved in with her parents, 
Sheryl and Antoinette Weight, in North Ogden. See R. 308:21-23,89. Also living at 
the home was Susan's sister, Serena, and Susan's two older children by a different 
father—both in the custody of Susan's parents. R. 308: 27-28, 89. In May 2004, 
Susan and Defendant had a brief affair and she became pregnant. R. 308:21-22. But 
in June, she told Defendant that he was no longer welcome at her parent's home. 
See R. 308: 22, 94. In late July and early August, the Weights saw Defendant on 
several occasions watching the house from a hill in the cemetary across the street. R. 
308:24,26,74,91-92,174. 
On August 1, Mr. Weight was notified that the car he had purchased and 
allowed Defendant to drive had been impounded by North Ogden police after 
Defendant's arrest for DUI. See R. 308:25,90. Mr. Weight went to the impound lot, 
paid the applicable fees, and recovered the car. R. 308:90-91. However, he did not 
return the car to Defendant because Defendant had failed to stay current on the car 
payments, as he had agreed. R. 308:24-25,90-91. 
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Burglary at the Weight Home 
On Sunday, the 15th of August, everyone in the Weight household but Susan 
and her napping son left the home just before 11:00 a.m. to attend church. R. 308: 
26-28,93,160,162,178. At 12:20 p.m., Susan and her son also left for church, leaving 
the house empty. R. 308: 28-29. Five minutes later, the instant messaging on 
Serena's laptop computer, which she had left running in her bedroom, went off line. 
R. 308:170. 
When the Weights returned home from church just before 2:00 p.m., Serena's 
Ford Escort was missing from the driveway. R. 308:29-30,94,164-67. When Serena 
went into the home, she took "special note" that her car keys had also been taken. 
R. 308: 166-67. The Weights also discovered that almost their entire coin and 
medallion collection was missing from their curio in the bedroom. R. 308: 95-96. 
That collection included LDS temple medallions by Rust Coin, commemorative 
coins for the LDS Conference Center and Nauvoo temple, six commemorative Harry 
Potter coins, various coins and coin sets from the birth years of family members and 
significant others, a gold and silver coin set commemorating the 2002 Olympics, and 
an 1898 gold coin mounted in a gold metal ring with a chain. R. 308:95-96. 
Also missing from the home was Serena's laptop computer and a laptop 
computer used by Mrs. Weight. R. 308:99-100,167-70,178-79. In addition, the thief 
took Susan's purse, containing her cell phone, her wallet, her mother's rings, and a 
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customized Zippo screwdriver set Susan had received as a Christmas gift from her 
employer, TrueValue. R. 308: 30-31. The pocket knife was probably one of only 
seven or eight in Ogden: it was specially ordered for the TrueValue employees in 
Ogden and was inscribed with the TrueValue name. R. 308: 79. 
The thief also took a VISA credit card that was in Serena's purse. See R. 308: 
163-64,171-73. Serena telephoned her credit card company to cancel the card, but 
before she did so, the thief made two unauthorized charges on the card. R. 308:171-
73. At 1:35 p.m., he used the card to purchase gas at a Smith's Food King in Salt 
Lake City. R. 309: 207. At 2:32, he used the card a second time to make a gas 
purchase at a Walker's convenience store in Payson. R. 309:207. 
Defendant's Pawning Spree 
In the days following the burglary, Defendant pawned coins and medallions 
at pawn shops in St. George, Mesquite, Nevada, and Salt Lake City. 
Pawn Plus (St. George). On August 16, the day after the burglary, Defendant 
appeared at Pawn Plus in St. George, pawning a 2002 Olympic gold medallion. R. 
308:48; P5; R. 309: 203-04,209,271-72,324-25. 
Cedar Post Pawn Shop (St. George). Two days later, on August 18, Defendant 
sold a rare 1898 gold coin to the Cedar Post Pawn Shop in St. George for two 
hundred dollars. R. 309:189-91,199,242,329. The coin matched the description of 
the 1898 coin identified by Mr. Weight as stolen from his home, but it was no longer 
9 
mounted to a gold metal ring with a chain. R. 308:96; R. 309:195. When Defendant 
appeared at the pawn shop, he was carrying a large duffle bag of coins and 
appeared "quite tired/' R. 309:189-90,192,197-98. Defendant told the clerk that his 
car had broken down on the freeway, that he had hitchhiked into town, and that he 
"had been walking a ways/' R. 309:190,196. After the clerk purchased the gold 
coin, he drove Defendant to a local motel, where Defendant said he was staying. R. 
309:193. 
Virgin Valley Pawn Shop (Mesquite, NV). One day later, on August 19, 
Defendant pawned eighty-eight silver coins and one silver piece at the Virgin Valley 
Pawn Shop in Mesquite, Nevada. R. 308:4445, 65-66, 69-71; P3-4; R. 309: 208-09, 
253,294-96,304,315-16.2 Seventy-eight of the 88 coins were LDS temple medallions. 
See R. 309:316-18. 
Crown Jewelers & Pawn (Salt Lake City). By the following day, Defendant was 
back in northern Utah. On August 20, he pawned numerous coins at Crown 
Jewelers & Pawn in Salt Lake City, including eight silver proof sets from years 1972, 
1974,1993 (two sets), 1994 (two sets), 1999, and 2003; a silver quarter series set; four 
silver quarter Milleniums; and six Harry Potter medallions. R. 309:263-67,278-82, 
289, 308-09, 312; P33; P7. He returned to the pawn shop three days later and 
2
 Although he did not testify, Defendant admitted to the judge during trial 
that he pawned 88 silver coins at Virgin Valley Pawn. R. 309:296-97. 
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pawned an additional four coins: a Liberty dollar, a walking Liberty half dollar, and 
two Morgan dollars. R. 309:279,282,289,310-11; P32; P8. 
Defendant's Incriminating Comments to His Brother-In-Law 
By August 25, Defendant was back in Ogden. R. 308:146-49; R. 309:292. He 
came into the Sacred Art Tatoo Parlor where his brother-in-law, Charles Hall, 
worked. R. 308: 146-49. Hall had heard that the Weights' home had been 
burglarized, but did not know what had been taken. R. 308:148-49. Defendant told 
Hall that Serena Weight's car was fast and had 'low mileage." R. 308:150. He also 
said that if the car was missing, "it could be in the desert somewhere." R. 308:150. 
Finally, he mentioned to Hall that he knew "where a couple [of laptops] were, and 
wanted to know if [he] was interested in one." R. 308:151. 
Defendant's Incarceration 
On September 9,2004, Defendant was incarcerated on unrelated charges in 
the Salt Lake jail. R. 309:224,237. 
Discovery of Serena Weight's Car in Scenic, Arizona 
On September 26, a construction worker noticed Serena Weight's Ford Escort 
parked on a roadway in Scenic, Arizona—it had not been there the previous day. R. 
308:102; R. 309:213-15,237-38,240-41,251; P15. When the car remained unmoved 
at that location for two days, the construction worker reported it to the Mohave 
County Sheriff's Office. R. 309:238-39,242. An examination of the car revealed that 
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someone had tampered with the steering column and hotwired it. See R. 309:219-
20. The car was not processed for fingerprints because it was very dusty, the 
windows had been left down, and someone had sprayed Shout laundry cleaner all 
over the interior of the vehicle. R. 309:243. The Weights7 insurance company later 
had the car towed to its auto auction lot in Ogden. R. 309: 217-19. 
Defendant's Attorney Redeems the Pawned Coins 
In early November, Defendant signed two notarized letters authorizing the 
release of the property he pawned at Virgin Valley Pawn Shop and Crown Jewelers 
& Pawn, to his attorney, Stephanie Miya. R. 308:45-48,65-69; R. 309:327; P4,6. Ms. 
Miya thereafter went to the two pawn shops, paid the bonds on the pawned items, 
and took possession of them. R. 308:65-71; R. 309:211, R. 309:256,282-89,304; 308, 
312P7-8. 
Defendant's Incriminating Disclosures 
Later in November, Defendant telephoned Susan from jail. R. 308: 75. He 
called her several times over the ensuing weeks, admitting that he knew the location 
of the stolen goods. See R. 308: 41. He told Susan that his attorney received the 
stolen medallions or coins "in lieu of payment" for her legal services, but that he 
would be able to "purchase them back from her." R. 308:41. 
On December 1, Detective Quinney transported Defendant from the Salt Lake 
City jail to the Weber County Jail so he could appear on a warrant issued by a justice 
12 
court in Ogden. R. 309:224. Shortly thereafter, Defendant again telephoned Susan, 
asking her to retrieve from among belongings at the jail notarized letters authorizing 
her to withdraw money from a St. George bank accoimt for the children's 
Christmas. R. 308:33-34,40-41,75. When Susan went to the jail and looked through 
Defendant's property for the notarized letters, she found a number of items that had 
been in her stolen purse: the customized Zippo screwdriver set inscribed with the 
TrueValue name, her mother's rings, her driver's license picture, and the picture of 
her son Wyatt. R. 308: 35-36. She also found a written list, in Defendant's 
handwriting, of telephone numbers she frequently used on her cell phone. R. 308: 
35,38-39. 
Some time after the burglary, Defendant sent Susan letters indicating that he 
would do what is necessary to have the stolen property returned. R. 308:50-53,76-
77. He also sent a letter of apology to Mrs. Weight: 
Dear Mrs. Weight, Hello. This isn't a letter to try and get you anything 
to do. I apologize for all of this. I severely apologize and ask all of 
your forgiveness. I'm scared and I'm at the bottom of the pit. I have 
only dug for myself. I don't know if I'm just digging a hole deeper, 
either. I screwed up, and had I not been on drugs, I would have never 
went where I went, or done what I done. I've done everything I can to 
keep a hold of everyone's concern, some 80 percent I retained. The 
rest, your mother's, is in Pinto, Utah. I can only speak so much here. I 
want nothing more than for you to know what you all need to know. 
Everything is safe for the time being. I did what I did, because - and 
this isn't an excuse, cause I thought my car was taken from me. Please 
forgive me, all of you. I need my family back. I need my life back. I 
need my kid. I need your forgiveness. I made a lot of bad choices. 
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R. 308:181-82; P14. (When Mrs. Weight began reading the letter at trial, Defendant 
interjected: "Excuse me. Excuse me, Your Honor. Id like to enter into a guilty plea 
at this time." R. 308:181. After an off-the-record discussion with the judge, the trial 
proceeded.) 
Detective Quinney's Investigation 
Detective Dirk Quinney of the North Ogden Police Department investigated 
the case and learned that Defendant had pawned the coins and medallions at the 
various pawns shops in St. George, Mesquite, and Salt Lake City. R. 309: 202-04, 
2008-09,328-29. Pawn Plus could not immediately find the 2002 Olympic gold coin 
Defendant had pawned at the shop, but found it a few weeks after Deputy Quinney 
visited the shop and thereafter surrendered it to Ogden police. R. 309:203-04,209, 
324-25. Cedar Post Pawn Shop no longer had the 1898 gold coin purchased from 
Defendant, having sold it to another customer. R. 309: 194, 271. When Deputy 
Quinney visited Virgin Valley Pawn in Mesquite and Crown Jewelers in Salt Lake 
City, he discovered that Stephanie Miya had already paid the bond on the coins and 
recovered possession of them. See R. 309: 210-11,277. Later, pursuant to a court 
order, Ms. Miya delivered the 204 coins she redeemed from Virgin Valley Pawn and 
Crown Jewelers to her attorney, Aric Cramer. R. 308:66-68,103; R. 309:293-94,314-
16,328. 
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On September 8, Detective Quinney went with Mr. Weight to Mr. Cramer's 
office for the purpose of identifying the coins. R. 308:103; R. 309: 254, 328. Mr. 
Weight identified 78 of the 80 temple medallions stolen from his curio—two were 
still missing. R. 308:103-05,123; R. 309: 316-18. Three of his coins had not been 
taken during the burglary. R. 308:105. Weight also identified as his a set of 1947 
coins corresponding to his birth year, a 1936 half dollar corresponding to the birth 
year of his wife, and numerous other coins or coin sets corresponding to the birth 
years of children, grandchildren, babysitters, and others. After Mr. Weight 
identified the coins as those stolen from his curio, Detective Quinney took 
possession of them. R. 309:270. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Hearsay and implied hearsay. Defendant contends that the trial court 
erred in permitting Deputy Quinney to give hearsay testimony regarding the 
location of the stolen car in Arizona. However, he did not object to the testimony 
and thus waived any challenge to its admission on appeal. Moreover, he invited 
any error when he stated that all were agreed that the car was found in Arizona. 
Defendant also contends that admission of the coins recovered from Aric 
Cramer's office was based on the implied hearsay of Mr. Cramer that the coins he 
provided Mr. Weight were the same coins Stephanie Miya provided him. However, 
Defendant has not analyzed his "implied hearsay" theory or otherwise cited to any 
15 
legal authority in support thereof. This court should not therefore address it. In any 
event, Defendant did not object to such "implied hearsay" at trial and he has thus 
waived any challenge to it on appeal. 
II. Chain of custody. Defendant contends that Mr. Cramer's failure to testify 
about his receipt and delivery of the coins was a necessary link to establish the 
foundation for the coins admission. The coins, however, were fairly unique, readily 
identifiable, and relatively impervious to change. Thus, Mr. Weight's identification 
of them as the coins stolen from his home was sufficient to establish foundation. 
III. Sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence. However, he has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict. 
Accordingly, this Court should presume that the evidence was sufficient to support 
Defendant's convictions. 
IV. Ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant waived his right to counsel 
and represented himself pro se. Accordingly, he cannot claim ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
V. Reopening of case to admit exhibits. The court acted well within its 
discretion when, as a housekeeping matter, it reopened the case to admit exhibits 
discussed during trial but not ruled on. 
VI. Cumulative error. Because there was no error, there was no cumulative 
error. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO THE ADMISSION 
OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHEN HE FAILED TO OBJECT TO IT 
AT TRIAL 
Defendant contends that numerous hearsay statements were admitted into 
evidence in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against 
him. Aplt, Brf. at 21-26, 37-40. Specifically, he objects to (a) Deputy Quinney's 
testimony regarding the location where the stolen car was discovered, and (b) the 
State's failure to call as a witness Defendant's attorney, Aric Cramer, regarding 
coins he provided to Detective Quinney and Mr. Weight at his office. Aplt. Brf. at 
21-26,37-40. Defendant's challenges to this testimony lack merit. 
A. Defendant waived any challenge on appeal to hearsay evidence 
regarding the location of the stolen car. 
At trial, Deputy Quinney testified that Serena Weight's car was found in 
Scenic, Arizona by Deputy Cardinal of the Mohave County Sheriff's Office. R. 309: 
214. He also testified that an employee of Tri-State Towing told him the car was 
towed from Scenic, Arizona to an auction lot in Ogden. R. 309:217-18. Defendant 
argues that the admission of this hearsay evidence violated his Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation, denying him "the opportunity to cross-examine these 
important witnesses against him." Aplt. Brf. at 23-24. Defendant, however, did not 
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object to the admission of this hearsay evidence and he thus waived any challenge 
to it on appeal. 
The law is well settled that absent plain error or exceptional circumstances, 
"claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal/7 State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 346. This rule of preservation "applies to every 
claim, including constitutional questions/7 Id. Moreover, the preservation rule is 
"not relaxed simply because the defendant appears pro se" State v. Brodowski, 600 
A.2d 925, 926 (N.H. 1991). A pro se defendant is expected to comply with, and 
bound by, the rules of evidence and aiminal procedure. See Nelson v. Jacdbsen, 669 
P.2d 1207,1213 (Utah 1983) ("As a general rule, a party who represents himself will 
be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of 
the bar/'); State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f 38, 137 P.3d 716 (observing that a 
defendant appearing pro se is expected to "comply with technical rules"). 
Defendant acknowledges that he did not object to Deputy Quinney's 
testimony regarding his conversation with the Tri-State employee. Aplt. Brf. at 22. 
However, he claims that he "objected to th[e] testimony" relating his conversation 
with Deputy Cardinal. Aplt. Brf. at 21-22. The record does not support this 
assertion.3 
3
 Defendant has not challenged on appeal the admission of the photographs. 
See Aplt. Brf. at 21-26. 
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During direct examination, Detective Quinney testified that Deputy Cardinal 
of the Mohave County Sheriff's Office showed him where the car was found. R. 309: 
214. Defendant did not object to this testimony, and the prosecutor continued with 
his examination of Detective Quinney. See R. 309:214. He showed Defendant four 
photographs of the area where Deputy Cardinal said the car was found. R. 309:214-
15. After laying a foundation, the prosecutor asked the trial court to admit the 
photographs. R. 309:215. Before doing so, the court asked Defendant if he had any 
objections to their admission. R. 309: 215. Defendant questioned only their 
relevance and, significantly, asserted that the car's location was not at issue: 
What evidence do they serve, other than the location of the car. I think 
we're all agreed that the car was found in Arizona. What does the 
picture have to prove? 
R. 309:215 (emphasis added). 
Defendant's failure to object to Detective Quinney's testimony resulted in a 
waiver of any challenge to that testimony on appeal. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at \ 
11. Moreover, Defendant's statement that "we're all agreed that the car was found 
in Arizona" constituted invited error. Having affirmatively led the trial court into 
believing that the location of the stolen car was not at issue, Defendant is barred on 
appeal from claiming error, plain or otherwise. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 
1023 (Utah 1987) (holding that where counsel "affirmatively led the trial court to 
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believe that there was nothing wrong with the instruction, the appellate court will 
not review it for manifest error).4 
Defendant may well have successfully objected to the testimony from Deputy 
Quinney regarding the car's location. However, the record suggests that Defendant 
strategically chose "not to dispute the indisputable," United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 
674,678 (9th Cir. 1973), but to use that evidence to advance his theory of the case, 
i.e., someone else stole the car. Thus, Defendant himself elcited hearsay evidence 
from Deputy Quinney providing further detail surrounding the car's discovery. 
During cross-examination, Defendant elicited from Deputy Quinney that on 
September 28, a construction worker reported the stolen car to police, after he had 
seen it parked on a Scenic roadside for two days without being moved. R. 309:237-
41. During this questioning, Defendant pointed out that he could not have driven 
the car to the Scenic location because he had been in jail since September 9 and the 
car first appeared in Scenic on September 26. R. 309:237-38,241. Later, in closing, 
Defendant reiterated this theory. See R. 309: 351-52. 
Defendant could not in any event prevail on a claim of plain error or 
exceptional circumstances because he has not argued those exceptions on appeal. 
See State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, % 33, 64 P.3d 1218 (refusing to address 
unpreserved claim where defendant did not argue plain error or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal). 
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In sum, Defendant waived any challenge to the hearsay evidence on appeal 
because he did not object to it at trial. Moreover, any possible error was invited 
because Defendant affirmatively agreed that the location of the stolen car was not at 
issue and he used the hearsay evidence to advance his theory of the case. 
B. The State did not introduce any hearsay statements from 
Defendant's attorney, Aric Cramer. 
Defendant also contends that the State relied on "implied hearsay" to 
establish the chain of custody linking Stephanie Miya's receipt of coins from the 
pawn shops and Mr. Weight's recovery of those coins from Aric Cramer's office. 
Aplt Brf. at 22-25. He complains that because the State did not call Aric Cramer as a 
witness, "it was left to the assumption of the judge" that the coins Mr. Cramer 
provided to Mr. Weight "were the same coins received by [Ms.] Miya." Aplt. Brf . at 
22. Defendant has not, however, identified the alleged hearsay statement of Mr. 
Cramer, implied or expressed, upon which the prosecution relied. See Aplt. Brf. at 
22-25. Nor has he explained the concept of "implied hearsay," how it applies 
generally, or how it applies in this case. See Aplt. Brf. at 22-25. Moreover, he has 
not cited to any legal authority supporting his argument of implied hearsay. In 
short, Defendant's argument on this issue "is conclusory and provides no 
meaningful analysis," as required under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure. State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 23,128 P.3d 1179. This Court should therefore 
refuse to consider Defendant's argument. Id. at f22. 
Even assuming arguendo that Defendant's implied hearsay claim was 
adequately briefed on appeal, this Court should not address it for the same reason it 
should not address his claim challenging the hearsay evidence of the stolen car's 
discovery: he waived it. Defendant acknowledges that the alleged implied hearsay 
"w[as] not objected to" at trial. Aplt. Brf. at 22. Accordingly, he has waived any 
challenge to that evidence on appeal. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 11. 
C. Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by misleading advice 
from the trial court. 
Citing Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 86,76 P.3d 1170, Defendant argues that 
the trial court's numerous errors "improperly implied to [him] that his valid 
objections were invalid." Aplt. Brf. at 34. Bovo, however, does not support his 
claim.5 
The Court in Bovo held that "[i]n some instances, lack of accurate advice by 
the trial court may be 'fundamentally unfair' to a -pro se party." Bovo, 2003 UT App 
286, at 1 12. The Court thus held that "[a] pro se defendant's lack of technical 
5
 Defendant treats this claim in point HI of his brief addressing ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See Aplt. Brf. at 33-37. The doctrine enunciated in Bovo, 
however, does not apply to an ineffectiveness claim, but is a limited exception 
excusing a pro se defendant from compliance with procedural rules. Accordingly, 
the State addresses it here. 
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knowledge of law and procedure.. . should be accorded every consideration that 
may reasonably be indulged/7' Id. (citations omitted). But as earlier explained by 
the Utah Supreme Court, "treasonable consideration for a layman acting as his own 
attorney does not require the court to interrupt the course of proceedings to 
translate legal terms, explain legal rules, or otherwise attempt to redress the ongoing 
consequences of the party's decision to function in the capacity for which he is not 
trained/' Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207,1213 (Utah 1983). In short, "[j]udges 
cannot be expected to perform [the] function" of defense counsel. Id. 
Pro se defendants have been excused from a failure to comply with procedural 
rules where they have not been sufficiently notified of the date of trial, Jacobsen, 669 
P.2d at 1214, where the court and prosecutor led them to believe that they would not 
be subject to imprisonment, Bovo, 2003 UT App 286, at f 1 3 , and where the court 
failed to give them simply advice on how to perfect a demand for a jury trial, id. at f 
12. Defendant contends that allegedly incorrect rulings on the admission of 
evidence are sufficient to trigger the Bovo exception. But as discussed above, 
defendant did not object to the hearsay and implied hearsay. The court was not 
required to act as counsel by sua sponte ruling on the evidence. See Jacobsen, 669 
P.2d at 1213. Defendant also cites to instances where objections to leading questions 
were overruled. Aplt. Brf. at 34-35. He has not, however, explained how the alleged 
leading questions harmed him. "A trial court has discretion in permitting leading 
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questions on direct examination 'as may be required to develop [the witness's] 
testimony/" State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 144 (Utah 1994) (citng Utah R. Evid. 
611(c)). In any event, an erroneous ruling on the admission of evidence is not alone 
sufficient to trigger the Bovo exception. 
n. 
THE COINS OBTAINED FROM THE OFFICE OF DEFENDANT'S 
ATTORNEY WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE 
The evidence at trial established that the Weights7 coin collections were stolen 
on August 15; that Defendant thereafter pawned some 200 coins and medallions at 
pawn shops from Salt Lake City to St. George to Mesquite, Nevada; that 
Defendant's attorney, Stephanie Miya, paid the bond on, and obtained possession 
of, the coins pawned by Defendant in Salt Lake City and Mesquite; that pursuant to 
a court order, Ms- Miya surrendered possession of those coins to her attorney, Aric 
Cramer; that Mr. Weight, accompanied by Deputy Quinney, identified coins at Mr. 
Cramer's office as those stolen from his home on August 15; and that Deputy 
Quinney seized those coins. See, supra, at 7-15. 
On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting the coins, arguing that the State did not establish the necessary chain of 
custody. Aplt. Brf. at 40-43. He contends that to introduce the coins, the State was 
required to call Mr. Cramer as a witness to testify that the coins he showed Mr. 
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Weight and Deputy Quinney were the same coins given to him by Ms. Miya. Aplt. 
Brf. at 41. This argument lacks merit. 
Defendant's "chain of custody" argument is a challenge to foundation. 
Whether a proper foundation has been laid to admit real evidence is governed by 
rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support 
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
Utah R. Evid. 901(a). In other words, "the proponent, prior to introducing [real] 
evidence, must first authenticate the evidence by showing that it is what the 
proponent claims it to be." State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898,900-01 (Utah App. 1996). 
"A proper foundation for the introduction of physical evidence may be laid 
either through witness identification or through establishment of the chain of 
custody." People v. Payne, 607 N.E.2d 375, 381 (EL App. 1993) (quotations and 
citations omitted). Whether chain of custody evidence is required depends on the 
nature of the evidence. Real evidence may be admitted through witness 
identification alone "[i]f the offered item possesses characteristics which are fairly 
unique and readily identifiable and if the substance of which the item is composed 
is relatively impervious to change." McCormicks's Handbook of the Law of Evidence % 
212, at 527 (E.W. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); accord Grundy v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 76, 
80 (Ky. 2000). On the other hand, "a substantially more elaborate foundation" may 
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be required "if the offered evidence is of such a nature as not to be readily 
identifiable, or to be susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination. 
McCormick, at 527; accord Grundy, 25 S.W.3d at 80. Such a foundation "will 
commonly entail testimonially tracing the 'chain of custody' of the item with 
sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been 
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with." McCormick, at 
527; accord Grundy, 25 S.W.3d at 80. 
The coins admitted in this case fall in the former category. They were fairly 
unique, readily identifiable, and relatively impervious to change. At trial, Mr. 
Weight identified as his the following coins: 
1947 coin set corresponding to his birth year, 1947, R. 308:106; 
Utah centennial commemorative coin, R. 308:106; 
1936 half dollar corresponding to his wife's birth year, R. 308:106-
07; 
LDS Conference Center coin he bought on line, R. 308:107; 
Various coin sets corresponding to the birth years of his 
grandchildren, R. 308:107; 
Harry Potter coins purchased by his wife on E-bay, R. 308:108; 
Silver quarter proof sets, R. 308:108; 
1889 and 1989 silver dollars, R. 308:108; 
Silver inget given to him by a friend to commemorate the birth of 
Mr. Weight's son, R. 308:108-09; 
1990 Eisenhower commemorative coin corresponding to the birth 
year of a baby sitter, R. 308:109; 
Nauvoo temple medallions, R. 308:109; 
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• Coin with black foam around it and coin with rectangular shape 
around it corresponding to birth years of "kids that have helped us 
in the house," R. 308:110; 
Salt Lake Temple centennial coin, R. 308:110; 
1893 Morgan dollar corresponding to his father-in-law's birth year 
and for which he paid $150, R. 308:110; 
Coins corresponding to his mother's birth year and his 
grandfather's birth year, R. 308:110; 
Gold Olympic coin and corresponding silver Olympic coin, R. 308: 
111; 
Silver eagles corresponding to the birth years of his children and 
grandchildren, R. 308: 111; and 
78 LDS temple medallions, R. 308: 111. 
While none of the coins were "one of a kind," they were sufficiently unique, 
especially in light of the fact they were found together, to support a finding that 
they were Mr. Weight's coins. See United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528,1531 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (holding that the trial court "consider[s] the nature of the evidence, and 
the surrounding circumstances, including presentation, custody and probability of 
tampering or alteration"). "'Where the [coins] found and the [coins] taken 
correspond in a fairly close way, the fact of the finding of [those] specific [coins] 
would have probative value and be relevant, because the [coins] found [are] fairly 
marked as identical with the [coins] taken." State v. Crowder, 114 Utah 202,197 P.2d 
917,207 (1948) (referring to denominations of money). 
Moreover, even though Mr. Weight was not always able to say with absolute 
certainty that the coin was in fact his, he did testify that it was identical to his coin. 
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This was sufficient. "[I]t is not necessary that such identification should positively 
and indisputably describe such article.,, Gouard v. State, 335 P.2d 920,922 (Okl. Cr. 
App. 1959). "If it is sufficiently described to justify its admission in evidence, the 
lack of positive identification goes to the weight of such evidence rather than its 
admissibility." id. (quotation and citation omitted). 
Even assuming arguendo the State was required to establish a chain of 
custody, it was sufficient. As noted, the State established that Defendant pawned 
the coins, that Ms. Miya redeemed them and thereafter surrendered them to Mr. 
Cramer, and that Mr. Weight then recovered coins matching the description of the 
pawned coins from Mr. Cramer. This evidence established a sufficient chain of 
custody. The State "need not prove a perfect chain of custody for evidence to be 
admitted at trial; gaps in the chain normally go to the weight of the evidence rather 
than its admissibility." People v. White, 527 N.W.2d 34,37 (Mich. App. 1994). 
III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD PRESUME THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS CONVICTIONS 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions 
for burglary and theft, complaining that "there are significant gaps in testimony 
received at trial that tie [him] to the crimes charged/' Aplt. Brf. at 29. Defendant 
acknowledges that he did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by proper 
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motion or objection and that he must therefore demonstrate plain error to prevail on 
appeal. See Aplt. Brf. at 26-27. However, this Court need not even address 
Defendant's plain error claim because he has failed to meet his threshold burden to 
marshal the evidence. 
To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient, Defendant must first 
"'marshal the evidence in support of the verdict/" State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 
14,989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,799 (Utah 1991)). 
This requires him to "'present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] 
resists/" State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, % 20,604 Utah Adv. Rep. 17. 
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991)). In other words, Defendant must assume the role of "devil's 
advocate." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. After presenting this evidence, 
Defendant must "'then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the verdict/" Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, a 1 14 (quoting 
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799). "It is not enough for Defendant to simply show that his 
evidence contradicts the . . . verdict or to reargue the weight of that evidence on 
appeal while ignoring contrary evidence." State v. Ferreri, 2005 UT App 465U (citing 
State v. Lopez, 2001 UT App 123, \ 19,24 P.3d 993). He must instead "ferret out a 
fatal flaw in the evidence." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. 
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In this case, Defendant has failed in the first instance to marshal the evidence 
supporting the verdicts. Defendant acknowledges that he "is cognizant of the 
requirement to marshal evidence in support of t h e . . . verdict," Aplt. Brf. at 29, but 
makes no attempt to satisfy that requirement. He simply "submits that even with 
an extensive marshaling of the evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported." 
Aplt. Brf. at 29. Because Defendant has wholly failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of his convictions, this Court should presume that the record supports the 
jury's verdict and affirm Defendant's convictions. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT 
App 191, at Tl 7, 20. Even assuming arguendo that Defendant satisfied his 
marshaling burden, he has nevertheless failed to identify "a fatal flaw in the 
evidence." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. 
The State's evidence against Defendant was strong. After Susan Weight told 
him not to come to her home any more, Defendant was seen watching the house 
across the street on several occasions. R. 308:24,26,74,91-92,174. On August 15, 
within five minutes after Susan and her son left for church, the home was 
burglarized and Serena's car was stolen. R. 308:28-31,79,94-96,163-67,170-73. In 
the ensuing week, Defendant pawned coins at four different pawn shops, from St. 
George, to Mesquite, and back to Salt Lake City. R. 308:44-45,48,65-66,69-71,; R. 
309:189-91,199,203-05,208-09,242,253,263-67,271-72,278-82,289,294-96,304,308-
09, 312,315-16,324-25,329. The majority of the coins were thereafter redeemed by 
30 
Defendant's attorney, given to her attorney, and identified by Mr. Weight. R. 308: 
45-48,65-71,103-05; R. 309:254-56,282-89,293-94,304,308,312-16,328. Defendant 
also made significant statements to others implicating him in the burglary and theft. 
He commented to his brother-in-law that Serena's car was fast, had low mileage, 
and may be in the desert somewhere. R. 308:146-50. Defendant also asked him 
whether he was interested in two laptop computers. R. 308:151. In letters to Susan, 
he said he would return the stolen property. R. 308:50-53,76-77. He wrote a letter 
of apology to Mrs. Weight, indicating that he believed his car had been taken from 
him, though offered that as no excuse. R. 308:181-82. He also said that he had tried 
to "keep a hold of everyone's concern, some 80 percent." R. 308:181-82. Finally, 
when Susan went through Defendant's belongings at the jail, she discovered her 
custom Zippo knife, her mother's jewelry, and other items that had been in her 
purse when it was stolen. R. 308:35-39. 
Defendant has identified no flaw in this evidence such that it would 
undermine the Court's confidence in the verdict. State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 52, % 10. 
He complains that the State gave no explanation as to how he traveled in a vehicle 
that had broken down on the 18th of August to Mesquite, Nevada on the 19th of 
August, to Salt Lake City on the 23rd of August, and back to St. George on the 9th of 
September. Aplt. Brf. at 29-30. He also complains that the State offered no 
explanation as to how the vehicle was hotwired, and found in Scenic, Arizona two 
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weeks after he had been placed in jail. Aplt. Brf. at 29-30. With respect to the theft 
of the coins, Defendant complains that the stolen coins were not unique, that the 
victim's list of stolen coins was incomplete, and that the State did not call his 
attorney as a witness to testify as to the origin of the coins in his possession. Aplt. 
Brf. at 30-31. Defendant complains that his fingerprints were not found on the 
scene. Aplt. Brf. at 31. Finally, he contends that evidence showing that the internet 
program on the stolen laptop was used twice while he was incarcerated in a St. 
George jail "calls into question" his theft of the laptop. Aplt. Brf. at 31-32. These 
complaints do not identify a fatal flaw in the evidence. They simply reargue the 
weight of the evidence. This is insufficient to reverse the verdict. See Lopez, 2001 UT 
App 123, at 119. 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT CONSTITUTION-
ALLY INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT 
Defendant contends that his standby counsel did not provide the effective 
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Aplt. Brf. at 32-33. But 
as acknowledged in his brief, Aplt. Brf. at 33, Defendant waived the right to counsel 
and represented himself at trial pro se. See R. 103,105. He was only assisted by 
standby counsel. "Since [Defendant] waived his right to counsel, his claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel necessarily fails. By exercising his 
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constitutional right to present his own defense, a defendant necessarily waives his 
constitutional right to be represented by counsel. Logically, a defendant cannot 
waive his right to counsel and then complain about the quality of his own defense/7 
Wilson v. Parker, 515 R3d 682,696 (6th Or. 2008). 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED THE STATE TO 
REOPEN ITS CASE TO PERMIT ADMISSION OF STATE 
EXHIBITS 
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
reopened the case after both parties rested to allow the admission of several State 
exhibits. Aplt. Brf. at 44-47. Defendant argues that when the exhibits were 
admitted, he "was not prepared and could not (especially acting pro se) react 
quickly enough to counter effectively after [he] thought the case was closed." Aplt. 
Brf. at 44. He claims that because the case was tried before a judge, the defendant 
was pro se, and the State and Defendant both rested their cases," reopening of the 
case was "confusing" and "unfair" to him. Aplt. Brf. at 46. This claim also lacks 
merit. 
Utah courts have long recognized that a trial court may within its discretion 
permit the State to reopen its case to introduce additional evidence. See, e.g., State v. 
Gregorious, 81 Utah 33,16 P.2d 893 (1932) (permitting State to reopen case to call 
additional witness after motion by defendant for directed verdict); State v. Lawrence, 
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120 Utah 323,234 P.2d 600 (1951) (observing that prosecutor "might properly and 
with little difficulty have moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence"); State 
v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954 (Utah App.) (permitting State to introduce additional testimony 
after orally dismissing a charge for insufficient evidence), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1992). Reopening a case to address the admission of exhibits that have been 
discussed during trial but not admitted is best described as a housekeeping function 
and is well within the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., See People v. Walker, 215 
A.2d 418,418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court 
allowed State to reopen case for limited purpose of admitting an exhibit that had 
been marked for identification and offered but not received in evidence); Carter v. 
State, 230 S.E.2d 357,358 (Ga. App. 1976) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial 
court permitted admission of two previously identified exhibits after both parties 
rested); People v. Robbins, 315 N.E.2d 198, 320 (HI. App. 1974) (finding no abuse of 
discretion where trial court admitted exhibits after State rested without having 
moved for their admission during trial). 
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reopened the 
case to permit the admission of the State's exhibits. After the parties rested and the 
court called for closing arguments, the clerk reminded the court about exhibits. R. 
309:331. With the aid of counsel, the court identified proposed exhibits upon which 
the court had not yet ruled. See R. 309: 331-33. The court identified State Exhibits 
34 
1043,16, and 28. R. 309:331-33. The court admitted the exhibits, but only after first 
eliciting from Defendant his position on their admission. 
Exhibits 10-13 were letters addressed to Susan Weight. See R. 308: 50-53. 
Susan testified that she received the letters in the mail, the letters were from 
Defendant, and they bore his handwriting. See R. 308:50-53. Defendant objected to 
the letters on the ground that they were not introduced at the preliminary hearing. 
R. 308: 51. The court overruled the objection, but the State neglected to move for 
their admission. R. 308: 51. Later, when the court revisited the exhibits after the 
parties rested, it asked Defendant if he wished to engage in "further discussion" 
regarding the exhibits. R. 309:333. Defendant complained that they were obtained 
by a second source and were identified only through Susan Weight's testimony. R. 
309:333. The court correctly overruled the objection, see Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(2), and 
admitted them into evidence. R. 309:333. 
Exhibit 16 was the box of coins which Mr. Weight identified as stolen from his 
home on August 15. See R. 308: 144. The box of coins, however, were in fact 
admitted into evidence at the close of the first day of trial. R. 308:186. Although 
Defendant complained at the time that any objection to the coins would not 
"matter," R. 308: 186, he affirmatively stated that he had "no" objection to their 
admission when the court revisited the issue after the parties rested, R. 309:332. 
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Exhibit 28 was the 2002 Olympic gold coin Defendant pawned to Pawn Plus 
in St. George and subsequently recovered by police. R. 308:48; R. 309:203-04,209, 
271-72, 324-25. The State moved for its admission during Deputy Quinney's 
testimony. R. 309:205. Defendant objected, claiming that Mr. Weight had testified 
that the coin was similar, but not his. R. 309:205. The court reserved its ruling on 
the motion and revisited after the parties rested. R. 309:205,331. The court again 
asked Defendant if he would like to be heard and Defendant responded that he 
would like to know where the coin came from. R. 309: 332. The prosecutor 
responded that they had received testimony on that and the court admitted the coin. 
R. 309: 332. A review of the record reveals that although Mr. Weight could not 
positively identify the coin as his because it had no serial number, he testified that it 
was identical to the gold coin which was part of his Olympic coin set. R. 308:111-12. 
In sum, a foundation for each of the exhibits had already been provided 
druing the trial. Moreover, when the trial court revisited the exhibits after the 
parties rested, it provided Defendant with an additional opportunity to make any 
further arguments against their admission and he availed himself of that 
opportunity. Finally, on appeal, Defendant has not argued that admission of the 
exhibits was otherwise improper. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that 
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Defendant was unfairly prejudiced by the court's reopening of the case or that the 
trial court otherwise abused its discretion. 6 
VI. 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ANY ALLEGED ERRORS DOES 
NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL 
In his final claim on appeal, defendant contends that this Court should 
reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial because the cumulative effect of 
the trial court errors prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Aplt. Brf. at 47. However, 
where, as here, the defendant "has failed to establish any errors... that prejudiced 
his right to a fair trial, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply/' Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,530 (Utah), cert denied, 513 U.S. 966,115 S.Ct. 431 (1994); accord 
State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72,f74,125 P.3d 878 (holding that "if the claims are found 
on appeal to not constitute error, or the errors are found to be so minor as to result 
in no harm, the doctrine will not be applied"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
6
 Defendant's reliance on State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), is also 
misplaced. None of the concerns of Brickey, e.g., overreaching, harassment, or 
forum shopping, are implicated in a reopening of the case. 
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